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Abstract
Within the context of the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument, one discus-
sion about the status of mathematics is concerned with the ‘Enhanced Indispens-
ability Argument’, which makes explicit in what way mathematics is supposed to
be indispensable in science, namely explanatory. If there are genuine mathemati-
cal explanations of empirical phenomena, an argument for mathematical platonism
could be extracted by using inference to the best explanation. The best explanation
of the primeness of the life cycles of Periodical Cicadas is genuinely mathemat-
ical, according to Baker (2005, 2009). Furthermore, the result is then also used
to strengthen the platonist position (e.g. Baker 2017a). We pick up the circular-
ity problem brought up by Leng (2005) and Bangu (2008). We will argue that
Baker’s attempt to solve this problem fails, if Hume’s Principle is analytic. We
will also provide the opponent of the Enhanced Indispensability Argument with
the so-called ‘interpretability strategy’, which can be used to come up with alter-
native explanations in case Hume’s Principle is non-analytic.
Keywords indispensability; mathematical explanation; platonism; nominalism; Frege
Arithmetic; Hume’s Principle; relative interpretation
1 Introduction
The classical indispensability argument (Quine, 1948; Putnam, 1971) is the backdrop
against which Baker (2005) has advanced the so-called ‘Enhanced Indispensability Ar-
gument’. Baker (2005, p. 224) echoes a point made by Maddy (1992), to wit the fact
that we do not tend to accept in our ontologies entities posited by our best scientific
models such as ‘frictionless slopes, ideal gases and infinitely-deep fluids’. Another
important point, which Baker takes from an exchange between Melia (2000) and Coly-
van (2002), is that we only ought to be ontologically committed to those entities that
are indispensable in the right way, which according to them means indispensable for
explanations. Common ground in this debate is that if there are mathematical entities
that fulfill the same kind of explanatory role as theoretical entities in scientific theo-
ries, then mathematical entities are on par with theoretical entities and mathematical
platonism prevails. Thus, the challenge is to find an example of such a mathematical
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explanation of a physical phenomenon. Baker (2005) purports to provide such an ex-
ample. Furthermore, Baker (2017a) uses this example to further boost the cause for
platonism.
In his (2005) paper, Baker presents a case in which he claims to have found an
example, in evolutionary biology, of a mathematical explanation of a physical phe-
nomenon. The example treats of the Periodical Cicada, which is a genus of the Ci-
cada family, of which the species have either a 13- or a 17-year life cycle. One of
the questions biologists are concerned with, is why the life cycles of these species are
prime. For instance, whether it might be the case that this very fact would give them
some evolutionary advantage. Thus, the thing to be explained, the explanandum, is the
primeness of the life cycles of Periodical Cicadas. Baker gives the basic structure of
the explanation (Baker, 2005, p. 233):
(1) Biological ‘law’:
Having a life cycle period which minimizes intersection with other periods is
evolutionary advantageous.
(2) Number theoretic theorem:
Prime periods minimize intersection (compared to non-prime periods).
(3) ‘Mixed’ biological/mathematical law:
Hence organisms with periodic life cycles are likely to evolve periods that are
prime.
(4) Ecological constraint:
Cicadas in ecosystem-type, E, are limited by biological constraints to periods
from 14 to 18 years.
(5) Species specific prediction:
Hence cicadas in ecosystem-type, E, are likely to evolve 17-year periods.
In the context of indispensability arguments in general, and the Enhanced Indis-
pensability Argument in particular, the step in the argument we are concerned with is
(2)1. As Field (1989, p. 15) puts it:
one of the assumptions that appears in this explanation is claim S, and we
are pretty sure that no explanation of the phenomena that does without
claim S is possible.
In our case, the reference to the number theoretic theorem in step (2) is S. It is an
Enhanced Indispensability Argument, because the number theoretic theorem (2) has a
genuine explanatory role, in a way quite different from for example idealized concrete
objects (Baker, 2005, p. 237). The argument has generated a lot of discussion — see,
1In (2017a, pp. 783–784), Baker gives an alternative version of the argument. But the first three steps
are the same as in the initial formulation. Baker points out that the length of the cicada life cycles can be
expressed as sums of perfect squares, which introduces more sophisticated mathematics.
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for instance, (Rizza, 2011; Wakil and Justus, 2017; Baker, 2017b; Barrantes, 2019).
In section 2 we pick up one problem that has been brought up, namely the circular-
ity problem. Next, in section 3 we will explicate how Baker proposes to solve that
problem. Subsequently, in section 4 we will argue that the problem shows up again
once a gap, resulting from the attempted solution to the circularity problem, has been
bridged by invoking Hume’s Principle, if Hume’s Principle is analytic. On the, non-
trivial, assumption that Hume’s Principle is not analytic, the defenders of the Enhanced
Indispensability Argument have at their disposal a mathematical explanation based on
Hume’s Principle, without circularity. In response, in section 5 we will provide the
opponent of the Enhanced Indispensability Argument with a strategy (called ‘the in-
terpretability strategy’) to come up with an alternative explanation, thereby allowing
for the assumption that Hume’s Principle is not analytic, and challenging the further
assumption that the Enhanced Indispensability Argument is indeed the best explana-
tion. In line with the main concern of this paper, we point out that one criterion for the
selection of the best explanation, namely mathematical power, is question-begging.
2 The claim of circularity
Analyzing the abovementioned example, Bangu notices that the explanandum, at least
in the way it is presented as above,
consists in a property-attribution claim, where the property in question is
primeness, a paradigmatic example of a mathematical property (Bangu,
2008, p. 18).
The problem with the fact that the explanandum contains a mathematical property is
that, and we remember that the strategy of inference to the best explanation is accepted
by both sides in the debate, the explanandum is assumed to be true. As Leng (2005,
p. 174) puts it:
Given the form of [the] argument, one might wonder why it is mathe-
matical explanations of physical phenomena that get priority. For if there
are . . . some genuine mathematical explanations . . . then these explanations
must also have a true explanans. The reason why this argument can’t be
used is that, in the context of an argument for realism about mathematics,
it is question-begging. For we also assume here that genuine explanations
must have a true explanandum, and when the explanandum is mathemati-
cal, its truth will also be in question.
Thus, for there to be something to explain at all, one assumes the truth of that
which is to be explained. It is therefore immediately clear why such an effort is being
made in order to find an example in the sciences. For if the explanandum contains a
mathematical property, like primeness, then
if mathematical properties apply to anything, they apply prima facie to
mathematical objects (Bangu, 2008, p. 18).
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Therefore, given the assumption that the explanandum is true because of the use of
an inference to the best explanation, and the presence of the mathematical property of
primeness in the explanandum, it would be the case that one is ontologically committed
to mathematical entities, namely numbers. But then it would be the case that mathe-
matical platonism is established beforehand, and as such the argument would indeed
be circular.
3 The response to the claim of circularity
As Baker (2009, p. 620) rightly notices, the claim of circularity has some force. He
acknowledges the fact that the way the example was initially formulated is indeed prob-
lematic. To escape the allegation of circularity, he reformulates the argument so as to
prevent the explanandum from having a mathematical property, and hence from having
the object(s) to which it applies. The basic structure of the argument is now presented
with the explanandum no longer mentioning primeness. What is to be explained is the
actual length of the life cycles in years (Baker, 2009, pp. 620–622):
(D) Data:
The length (in years) of the life cycle of cicada subspecies A is 13.
The length (in years) of the life cycle of cicada subspecies B is 17.
The data does mention numbers however, which are of course mathematical enti-
ties, but one thing that can be done, it is suggested, is to paraphrase data (D) in first-
order logic with identity. This way, one gets rid of the reference to mathematics. So,
the first datum, with F as the predicate for ‘year of the life cycle of cicada subspecies
A’, in first order logic is2:
(Dfol)
∃x1 . . .∃x13(Fx1∧ . . .∧Fx13∧ x1 6= x2∧ . . .∧ x12 6= x13∧
∀x14(Fx14↔ (x14 = x1∨ . . .∨ x14 = x13)))
It is clear that the reason for the shift from an explanandum containing the notion
of prime to an explanandum containing numbers, is that the latter can be formulated in
first-order logic with identity (like above), whereas the former cannot be paraphrased
away in first-order logic with identity. Baker (2009, p. 619) recognizes this, and refers
to a proof by Boolos (1981). The reason why the notion of ‘prime’ in a sentence like
“The length (in years) of the life cycle of cicada subspecies A is prime” cannot be
expressed in first-order logic, is because of the infinite domain of prime numbers. The
reference to primeness is therefore put tentatively in (H), because it does refer to a
mathematical property, and is used to ultimately ‘bootstrap’ the explanation of data
(D) in relation to the observed primeness of the life cycles. The argument continues as
follows:
2For completeness, both the 13- as well as the 17-year life cycles were mentioned in (D). However, to
prevent too much repetition, in what follows only the first datum will be used.
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(H) Tentative hypotheses:
The length (in years) of the life cycle of cicada subspecies A is prime.
The length (in years) of the life cycle of cicada subspecies B is prime.
(1) Biological ‘law’
Having a life cycle period which minimizes intersection with other periods is
evolutionary advantageous.
(2) Number theoretic theorem
Prime periods minimize intersection (compared to non-prime periods).
(3) Explanation (E)
The lengths (in years) of the life cycles of periodical organisms are likely to
be prime (explanation of (H)).
(4) Ecological constraints
The subspecies of Periodical Cicadas are limited by their respective biological
constraints.
(5) Extended explanation (E∗) (E) with added biological constraints yields an
explanation of (D).
One notices that steps (1) through (5) correspond to the initial argument structure
given in section 1, with steps (H) and (1) through (3) being the tentative part of the
argument. The remainder of the argument is an inference to the best explanation in
order to establish the ontological commitment to numbers and their properties, in this
case primeness.
(6) (E*) is the best explanation of (D).
(7) Hence we ought to believe (E∗), and thereby (E).
(8) But (D) and (E) together imply (H).
(9) Hence we ought to believe (H)
So, the basic idea underlying the reformulated argument structure is that, by para-
phrasing data (D) in first-order logic with identity and putting the hypotheses pertaining
to the primeness of the periodical cicadas life cycle tentatively, circularity can be pre-
vented.
Regarding the tentative hypotheses in (H), there are two possibilities. The prime-
ness of the length (in years) of the life cycles could either have a common explanation,
describing them as prime, or have no common explanation, in which describing them
as prime is a coincidence (Baker, 2009, pp. 621–622). It is then suggested that the best
explanation of tentative hypotheses (H) is explanation (E). And, given that very fact, it
is then claimed that it
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can also be turned into an explanation of . . . [(D)], by adding the subspecies-
specific ecological constraints (Baker, 2009, p. 621).
This brings us to the matter of the connection between the explanandum and the
explanans. How can an explanation in which the mathematical property of prime is
used, such as in the mathematical explanation (E) of tentative hypothesis (H), be turned
into, or transferred to, an explanation of a datum which is paraphrased away in first-
order logic with identity, such as in (Dfol)?
4 The circularity problem again
The main argument of this section questions the feasibility of (E∗) yielding an explana-
tion of (D) within the context of the Enhanced Indispensability Argument. It is noted
that the inference from ‘ is (likely to be) prime’, which is used in (E∗) because of
(E), to ‘ is 13’, which is used in (D), needs explaining.
Given that the mathematical explanation of the tentative hypotheses, which states
that the life cycles are prime, is accepted as the best explanation, the next step is to ex-
plain how the explanation of the tentative hypotheses can be turned into an explanation
of Data (D). Recall that (D) was paraphrased in first-order logic with identity, like in
(Dfol). Note that, on the one hand, (Dfol), treats of a plurality, that is, the collection of
objects expressed by the sentence in first-order logic with identity. But (E), on the other
hand, treats of an entity, which (likely) has the property of being prime. This means
that the context of the two sentences differs, and that therefore the two contexts need
to be linked. Without such a link it is not possible to predicate primeness of a sentence
in first-order logic with identity. The crucial observation is therefore that there is a gap
between (Dfol) and (E∗): how can the plurality of (Dfol) end up as an entity about which
(E∗) claims that it is (likely) prime?
In light of this, and thus for Baker’s move to prevent circularity to work, we need
some sort of bridge principle, so as to be able to logically relate the explanans to the
explanandum by connecting pluralities to entities. Without such a logical connection,
there is no mathematical explanation of the empirical phenomenon described by the
sentence in first-order logic with identity. In light of Frege’s work (Frege, 1893) and
the neo-Fregean research programme (Burgess, 2005), a natural suggestion would be
to use Hume’s Principle (HP), which states that “for any concepts F, G, the number of
F is identical to the number of G if and only if F and G are equinumerous”(Shapiro,
2000, p. 110):3
HP ∀F∀G(#F = #G↔ F ∼= G)
The principle HP is a principle that connects the plurality of objects having proper-
ties F and G to entities (numbers). If one combines HP with dyadic second-order logic,
then Frege’s Theorem says that the Peano postulates can be deduced, given Frege’s
definitions of zero, successor and natural number (Burgess, 2005, p. 26). Furthermore,
Dedekind’s Theorem says that the existence of unique operations on natural numbers
3We follow the notation of (Boolos, 1998, p. 139)
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satisfying the recursion equations for addition and multiplication can be deduced in
dyadic second-order logic from the Peano postulates (Burgess, 2005, p. 29). Once we
have that, we can start proving results about prime numbers.
So far, so good, one might think. However, note that, given HP and Frege’s defini-
tions, Dfol is provably equivalent with the following statement:
D# #F = 13
Now, the question is whether this provable equivalence is also an analytical equiva-
lence. By analytic equivalence, it is meant that the equivalence follows from nothing
but logic and definitions. Since the only things that have been assumed are dyadic
second-order logic, Frege’s definitions and HP, the question boils down to the question
whether HP is analytic.
It is clear that HP is at least a material equivalence statement. But neo-Fregeans
will immediately point out that HP is not just a regular material equivalence. Take for
instance the following example, borrowing from Quine (1953, p. 37). The material
equivalence
‘creature with a heart’ if and only ‘creature with kidneys’
does not carry over any content from the one side to the other. This is because the ma-
terial equivalence does not hold out of necessity. Rather, it holds by virtue of accidental
matters of fact. But HP on the other hand functions, at the very least, as an axiom for
#F , and is therefore, trivially, a provable equivalence. Furthermore, it is taken to be an
implicit, contextual definition, thereby allowing for the cardinal numbers to be defined.
As Wright (1999, p. 10) puts it:
The key idea [of HP in the neo-Fregean context] is that an instance on the
left-hand side of an abstraction principle is meant to embody a reconcep-
tualization of the type of state of affairs depicted on the right.
Because of this reconceptualization, HP is often taken to be an analytic principle.
But then Dfol is analytically equivalent to D#. Consequently, in the explanation (i.e.
the ordered set of the explanandum and the explanans) the explanandum is analytically
equivalent to a sentence that, given Frege’s Theorem and Dedekind’s Theorem, has
to be interpreted as having mathematical content. Hence, the explanandum then also
has to be interpreted as having mathematical content, but that would beg the question
against the nominalist.
Boolos (1998) however, has argued that HP cannot be considered to be an ana-
lytic principle, for reasons which would complicate matters even more for a position
like Baker’s. The problem is that HP entails the existence of infinitely many abstract
objects. And analytic principles should not commit one to so many objects, let alone
abstract objects. Rather, analytic principles should be ontologically neutral (Boolos,
1998, pp. 305–306).
In response to the criticism formulated by Boolos, some have argued that questions
of meaning and questions of existence should be separated. The existence of num-
bers does not follow from HP, or so it could be argued. Rather, they are presupposed,
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resulting from the fact that neo-Fregeans consider HP to be true. If questions of exis-
tence were indeed, pace neo-Fregeans, to be settled elsewhere, this would mean that
HP would therefore not commit one to the existence of numbers, and could perhaps
still be considered an analytic principle. However, this would not suffice for Baker,
because it would be neutral with regard to the existence of numbers. In fact, this is why
a conditional version of HP is acceptable for a nominalist (Field, 1984, p. 661):
HPcond If numbers exist, then ∀F∀G(#F = #G↔ F ∼= G)
Clearly, HPcond would only bridge the gap between arithmetic on the one hand
and Dfol on the other hand conditional on the existence of numbers. So, we would
only have a mathematical explanation if it is already agreed upon that numbers exist.
But the Enhanced Indispensability Argument was supposed to justify the belief in the
existence of numbers. Circularity looms again.
Wright (1999, pp. 9–10) points out, in effect, that the intelligibility of HPcond pre-
supposes itself that numbers exists. The antecedent ‘numbers exist’ will contain ex-
pressions of the form #X . But there is no longer a sufficient condition to determine
the truth of sentences containing those expressions and, therefore, there is no longer a
contextual definition available. That is why he concludes that HPcond has to be “rela-
tivized to an antecedently given domain of quantification” (p. 9) and that “the existence
of numbers is a further fact, something which the (mere) equinumerosity of concepts
may leave unresolved” (p. 10). If analyticity is supposed to be ontologically neutral,
then one cannot accept the analyticity of HPcond.
This, then, is the problem the Enhanced Indispensability Argument faces when it
is intended as an argument for mathematical platonism: the predicate ‘ is prime’ can
either not latch on to the first-order logic sentence without the latter being interpreted
as a mathematical statement, resulting from the supposed analyticity of HP, or the
predicate can not latch on to the first-order logic sentence with identity without making
it conditional upon the existence of numbers, as is the case with a conditional version
of HP. Of course, this problem depends on the supposed analyticity of HP. There is
an ongoing debate about this. Recently, Boccuni and Woods (forthcoming) defend the
idea that HP is a conceptual truth, whereas Darnell and Thomas-Bolduc (forthcoming)
argue that HP is not analytic. We argue that the outcome of that debate is relevant for
the assessment of the Enhanced Indispensability Argument. In the next section, we
will investigate the option of the non-analyticity of HP.
5 The interpretability strategy
In the previous section a gap in the Enhanced Indispensability Argument was identified
and this gap was bridged with the help of HP. It was then argued that the circularity
problem resurfaces, if HP is an analytic truth. Thus, for the bootstrapping strategy as
suggested by Baker to work, and to allow for the possibility to escape circularity, the
Enhanced Indispensability Argument has to assume that HP is non-analytic. The non-
analyticity of HP, however, is not something which is a matter of course. This section
will nonetheless suppose, for the sake of argument, that HP is not an analytic principle.
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The defender of the Enhanced Indispensability Argument could then give the follow-
ing explanation: HP with dyadic second-order logic and added biological constraints
yields an explanation of Dfol. If this is the best explanation, then the conclusion of the
indispensability argument is that one should accept the existence of (Frege-)numbers.
It has not been settled yet that the mathematical explanation based on HP is the best
explanation, which is needed for the Enhanced Indispensability Argument to establish
platonism. This section challenges the further assumption that the Enhanced Indis-
pensability Argument is indeed the best explanation, thereby arguing that even if it
would turn out that HP could be considered a non-analytic principle, hence allaying
the worries of circularity, platonism still wouldn’t be established. Not only will we
offer an alternative explanation strategy, we will also take up the circularity concern
once more and remark that one criterion for the selection of the best explanation is
question-begging.
Let us then have a look at the alternative explanation. In what follows, we assume
some knowledge about intermediate logic — see, for instance, (Boolos et al, 2007).
We will also make use of the notion of relative interpretation. Roughly, a relative
interpretation of a theory into another theory is a translation of the language of the first
theory into the language of the second theory, where the translation has to meet certain
conditions, and a proof that the translation of every theorem of the first theory is a
theorem of the second theory. For formal definitions, see (Enderton, 2001, section 2.7).
The starting point is a theory of concatenation, called QT (Damnjanovic, 2017,
pp. 383–383). The language of QT is a first-order language with identity, individual
constants a, b, and a binary function symbol ∗. The theory has five axioms:
QT1 ((x∗ y)∗ z) = (x∗ (y∗ z))
QT2 ¬(x∗ y= a)∧¬(x∗ y= b)
QT3
(x∗a= y∗a→ x= y)∧(a∗ x= a∗ y→ x= y)∧
(x∗b= y∗b→ x= y)∧ (b∗ x= b∗ y→ x= y)
QT4 ¬(a∗ x= b∗ x)∧¬(x∗a= x∗b)
QT5 x= a∨ x= b∨ (∃y(a∗ y= x∨b∗ y= x)∧∃z(z∗a= x∨ z∗b= x))
The result is a theory about the concatenation of non-empty strings of a’s and b’s.
We claim that QT is an interesting starting point for a nominalist. First, Goodman
and Quine (1947) made already use of expressions of concatenation in their nominal-
istic theory of syntax,4 which they use in an attempt to reconstruct classical mathemat-
ics.5 Second, it turns out that QT is mutually interpretable with Adjunctive Set Theory
(AST) — see (Damnjanovic, 2017). The language of AST is a first-order language
with binary relation symbol ∈. The theory has only three axioms:
4In fact, any metaphysical theory that claims to be true should be compatible with a theory of truth of
sentences, which depends on a theory of syntax, which in turn is hardly conceivable without some kind of
theory of concatenation. See (Tarski, 1936).
5Goodman and Quine (1947, p. 106) decline to assume that there are infinitely many objects. As it will
turn out, QT has no finite models. So, QT goes beyond what they are willing to assume. However, other
nominalists, notably Field, have no scruples in assuming that there are infinitely many objects.
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NULL ∃x∀y¬y ∈ x
ADJ ∀x∀y∃z∀w(w ∈ z↔ (w= x∨w= z))
EXT ∀x∀y(∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ x= y)
The result is a very weak fragment of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Choice
(ZFC). Field (1992) has tried to show that ZFC with so-called urelements is ‘conser-
vative’ in the sense that it is consistent with any internally consistent purely physical
theory. This played an important role in his nominalistic project. Since even Field
thinks that ZFC with urelements is conservative, AST should definitely be so.
The good news is that QT is mutually interpretable with a very weak system of
arithmetic, called Robinson Arithmetic (Q) — see (Damnjanovic, 2017).6 This is cer-
tainly interesting, but at first sight it might be disappointing that it can only interpret
a very weak system of arithmetic, especially compared to second-order Peano Arith-
metic (PA2), which one can get out of the combination of HP and dyadic second-order
logic. But it is important to keep the dialectic in mind. We are not in the business of
giving a nominalistic reconstruction of the totality of mathematics, or even as much as
is possible. We are also not preoccupied with developing a nominalistic reconstruc-
tion of all the mathematics that is used in natural science. The sole point of interest is
whether there is a nominalistic explanation for those natural phenomena for which it is
claimed that they are best explained mathematically.
Theory Q has some deductive power: for any Σ01-sentence φ , φ is provable in Q if
and only if φ is true in the standard model of arithmetic. With a Σ01 is meant a sentence
of the form ∃xψ , with ψ a formula built up from atomic formulas using only the logical
operators and bounded quantifiers. The latter are of the form ∀x≤ t or ∃x≤ t (with t a
term not containing x). Moreover, every recursive function and relation is definable in
Q by a Σ01-formula.
The question is now whether Q has enough deductive power for providing a math-
ematical explanation of the cicada case. First, note that the multiplication and quotient
functions, the maximum and minimum functions, and the properties of being prime
and co-prime belong to the categories of recursive functions and relations. We can for-
mulate all the key notions with the help of Σ01-formulas. Second, one may worry that
the lemmas used by Baker are unbounded universal quantifications ranging over all
numbers, not just the numbers smaller than some number. However, those unbounded
universal generalisations are far stronger than are needed in the explanations of natural
phenomena. Take the case of the cicadas. There is no reason to consider life cycles of
cicadas that exceed, let’s say, the life span of Earth. There is no problem with using
bounded universal quantifications because whatever natural phenomenon that needs
to be explained is going to be bounded anyway. Recall the ecological constraints that
were used in the (reformulated) Enhanced Indispensability Argument. It is exceedingly
6Interestingly, Q is not interpretable in mereology, another favourite of nominalists. This is a conse-
quence of the following theorem listed by Niebergall (2011): there is no consistent mereological theory in
which AST is relatively interpretable. This is certainly relevant for the discussion about the evaluation of
the nominalistic paraphrase of statements about primeness given by Tallant (2013), because he uses mere-
ological fusions. Taking it further, he hopes that mereology will be enough to paraphrase all “scientifically
explanatory mathematics”. The latter cannot include Robinson Arithmetic, if his project is to succeed.
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likely that similar constraints will be used in any purported mathematical explanation
in natural science. This strategy can also be applied to the “more general” explana-
tion in (Baker, 2016) of the primeness of the life cycles of cicadas that is based on
Bertrand’s postulate.
The explanation strategy sketched above can be applied in other cases as well. The
reason is that Q can interpret in its turn a quite wide range of mathematical theories,
including (first-order) Euclidean geometry, consequence, Tarski’s theory of real closed
ordered fields, and the so-called Base Theory for Feasible Analysis (Ferreira and Fer-
reira, 2013). In all cases of explanations that essentially involve any of the mentioned
theories, one can use the relative interpretability theorems to conclude, first, that there
are theorems in Q that are interpretations of the theorems in the aforementioned the-
ories and, second, that there are theorems QT that are interpretations of the relevant
theorems in Q. Let us call this the interpretability strategy. Metaphorically speaking,
what we propose to do is to run simulations of software written in one language within
other software written in another language, and which are ultimately reducible to ma-
nipulations of bits.
Ontologically speaking, the nominalist is committed to no more than non-empty
strings of a’s and b’s, because that is what the existential quantifiers in QT range over.7
Independently of ontological controversies, we think that the interpretability strategy
is interesting in the context of debates of mathematical applications and mathematical
indispensability for science. For it is worthwhile to know what the weakest mathemat-
ical theories are in which one can interpret whatever mathematics is used in scientific
explanations.8
There are at least two alternative explanations available in the cicada case. The first
is an explanation invoking Hume’s Principle (considered to be non-analytic), dyadic
second-order logic and some ecological constraints. The second is an explanation in-
voking Robinson Arithmetic, which is subsequently interpreted within a theory of con-
catenation of non-empty strings of a’s and b’s. If one wants to conclude that (Frege-
)numbers exist, which is in line with platonism and which goes against nominalism, it
needs to be established in that the first explanation is the best. This has to happen with-
out begging the question. Frege Arithmetic has a lot more mathematical strength than
Robinson Arithmetic. But a nominalist should not be concerned about that, whereas a
difference in empirical scope would be cause for concern. This is a challenge for the
defender of the Enhanced Indispensability Argument.
7We are relying here on Quine’s criterion for ontological commitment (Quine, 1948). Some participants
in the debate have questioned this criterion — see, for example, Azzouni (2004).
8Our strategy is in this sense similar to a strategy suggested by Bueno (2001, p. 119). His idea was for
a nominalist to capitalize on the so-called reverse mathematics programme, initiated by Harvey Friedman,
and aiming at discovering what the weakest axioms are to prove a theorem. There are a couple of differences
though. One is that Bueno is aiming at a nominalistic reconstruction of as much of mathematics as possible,
whereas we are only talking about what Tallant (2013, p. 2074) calls “scientifically explanatory mathemat-
ics”. Another difference is that Bueno focuses on abstraction principles, which he wants to paraphrase using
a combination of plural logic and mereology.
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6 Conclusion
The much discussed case study of the prime numbered life cycle of the Periodical Ci-
cada, as presented by Baker (2005, 2009), presents an interesting account in which
mathematics (and, according to Baker (2017a), even sophisticated mathematics) ap-
pears to play an indispensable role in the explanation of an empirical phenomenon.
The question this paper set out to answer was whether it can be used as an ontological
argument for mathematical platonism.
For there to be a mathematical explanation of the first-order logic datum at all, the
mathematical explanans needs to be able to connect to the explanandum. However,
resulting from the strategy to paraphrase the reference to numbers away in first-order
logic with identity, the explanandum now treats of a plurality. This means that the con-
text differs in the two cases. Without a link between the two contexts, it is not possible
to predicate primeness of the sentence in first-order logic with identity. To overcome
the gap, Hume’s Principle is a natural suggestion to function as a bridge principle,
because it can be used in combination with dyadic second-order logic to say things
about prime numbers. This is relevant, because without it there would be no logical
connection between the plurality in the explanandum and the property of primeness in
the explanans, and thereby no mathematical explanation. Several philosophers think
that Hume’s Principle is an analytic truth. But then the explanandum has therefore,
inevitably, to be interpreted as having mathematical content (since it is analytically
equivalent to a mathematical sentence). And for this reason the argument ultimately
begs the question against the mathematical nominalist.
Some philosophers think that Hume’s Principle is not an analytic truth. In that
case there can be a mathematical explanation of the explanandum, paraphrased in first-
order logic. This explanation makes use of Hume’s Principle, dyadic second-order
logic, which together form a theory called ‘Frege Arithmetic’, and certain ecological
constraints. It is, however, not settled that this is the best explanation. In order to
provide an alternative explanation we develop the so-called interpretability strategy.
The idea is to use the relative interpretability of several mathematical theories into an
elementary theory of arithmetic, called ‘Robinson Arithmetic’, which is in turn inter-
pretable in a theory of concatenation of non-empty strings of a’s and b’s. Acceptance
of the latter theory only commits one to the existence of those strings, but at the same
time one can prove the interpreted theorems of quite a bit of mathematics. Sure, the
mathematical power of Robinson Arithmetic is much less than the mathematical power
of Frege Arithmetic, but for a nominalist that is a question-begging difference, whereas
a difference in empirical scope would not be question-begging.
Regardless of the question whether mathematics does indeed do (part of) the ex-
planatory work in the discussed example, two take-home lessons are the following.
First, the debate on the status of Hume’s Principle as an analytic truth is relevant for
the debate on the Enhanced Indispensability Argument. More generally, this applies to
the debate on the status of so-called abstraction principles as well. Second, the logical
and mathematical work on relative interpretations of mathematical theories should be
of great interest for anyone working on the topics of mathematical applications and
mathematical indispensability.
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